Hey, awesome. So we have heard a lot today and earlier during the conference about incident response and kind of getting ready to, the whole idea of preparing in advance. And one of the ideas how you can train and prepare for such a disaster before it happens is exercising training. Know, this whole idea of tabletop exercises was probably mentioned multiple times. So this is what our guests going to be talking about today, and let me introduce them properly. So we have Naro Miter, who is the C-I-C-E-O of Arm text, a leading provider of secure out of bound communication solutions. His company serves hundreds customers across government and to various high profile and secure industries. And of course he's also has a long history in working with different companies such as Accenture, security Practice and other high profile security organizations. And of course he is currently serving on multiple advisory boards as well and has experience with advising presidential campaigns, congressional workers and stuff like that.
So he's joined by Matthew Welling, who is a partner in Crowell and more in privacy and cybersecurity group. And he actually heads those actual incident response and preparedness courses, solutions technologies. So we, we have our, a true expert who has not just been a, a, how you said, a long career in software development and actual incident response, but comes from an academic background. And he's also teaching at the Johns Hopkins Information Security Institute. So we have experts on stage. And I guess before we actually kick up the panel, they wanted me to draw your attention to the guide or for cybersecurity tabletop exercises, which you can download after the presentation if you're interested in more details. So met, or my first question would be to you. So can you dive a little bit deeper on the very notion of tabletop exercises? Why, like what are they and why companies do actually need them?
Yeah, thanks. I'd be, I'd be happy to. So just to start at the beginning, a tabletop exercise is a simulation of a cybersecurity incident and then the company's response to it. So whoever your participants are, they all act in their roles and they walk through how they respond to an incident, gets his name. 'cause historically these often occurred literally around a table with everybody there and more modernly. Sometimes they're virtual, but still the same idea. And this is all going on with a facilitator or a moderator who's gonna kind of step through different kind of factual, simulated factual scenarios. And then everybody responds to them, you know, as if that's kind of a new update in your investigation. G, getting to the why, there's a, there's a quote by a, a famous samurai, I believe Miyamoto Mushi, we can only practice how we fight. And it's the same idea here that if your organization has never actually practiced responding to an incident, you know, how can you, you know, fairly think that you're, you're prepared is, is the idea.
And in going through these tabletop exercises and these, these practices, you develop kind of a muscle memory on how to, how to respond. There's also some additional value as a lawyer always keeping that in mind that, you know, it is a demonstration of, you know, why you're, excuse me, a demonstration that you are actually practicing these things. There are some other values there, we'll, we'll talk about in a second. But you know, just from a practical standpoint, it also builds a lot of trust in your organization that not only do you know how to do your job, but you're seeing other people actually doing theirs and, and acting in their roles as well.
So I actually think there's a a point I wanna add here, right? So there's some additional ways of looking at the value, one of which was really well summed up by IBM in their latest cost of a data breach study. And it showed where organizations were spending their money after a data breach. So they've just been through this challenge and they're now having to elect where do I put my limited budget and financing next? And more than 50% of them, the highest spend was actually on incident response planning and testing. So if that's where they go the minute they've had a breach right afterwards, that's what they're reinvesting in. It's telling you that they all felt under-prepared and that they want to practice how they plan to fight all over again.
Right. Great. So that guide, that's actually that that incident response guide, which you, which we discussed earlier and which you are asking me to mention specifically. Can you maybe kind of dive a little bit deeper? What was the original inspiration for creating it?
Yeah, so I, I think by now it's no secret right at this conference everyone's been mentioning NIST two DORA changing and evolving SEC requirements. The reality is globally what we're seeing is this movement towards emphasizing the role of executives, boards and senior leadership in oversight over cybersecurity and in particular incident response,
Right? And so when we were first setting out to, you know, when we were first looking at the field of what was available for executives, one of the things we quickly realized is, is in keeping with that historical tendency to relegate incident response exercises to the technologists, this is something the IT folks go and do in the basement. That by and large the materials that were available were also principally focused on IT and securities role during an incident, they were missing questions for the CFO, for legal, for finance, for hr, for all of the other non-IT and non-security functions that might be impacted. On top of that, we noticed that a lot of the material that was there was really stale. The scenarios and modules hadn't really kept up with the times, right? They were based on a attacks that we might've seen 10 years ago, but they weren't covering what was actually happening today.
There was also a lack of dy dynamicism, right? So the questions themselves were highly formulaic. You might see a question that said, Hey, do you have an out-of-band comms? Yes, check the box. But there was nothing that dove in deeper in that challenge, that assumption to say, well wait, is your out-of-band comms really the right out-of-band comms for an incident? And then to top it off a little bit further, you know, ultimately we decided that given that we are adopted by, you know, 700 plus organizations now four security operations and incident response, if we were going to give back to our collective defense somewhere it made sense to invest in, you know, an open source set of capabilities or tools that everyone could leverage. And so for this particular project, we proposed to Carl Mooring, a collaborative effort to co-publish a guide where we would bring our technology expertise to the table, they'd bring the legal side in, and then we would then release this into like a creative Commons license so everyone could rip and use this out as like tear sheets, use them like Legos and rebuild into the scenarios that they need to run that are right for their organization.
Yeah, and if I could just jump in on that point, I just wanna highlight something that Nave just said about the Creative Commons license on this. We're literally giving it away, not just to take it, you know, go home and and read the the pamphlet, but we want you to tear it out and use it. And just to highlight it, when was the last time you saw lawyers give anything away that that really, this is our view is our contribution back to the security community. We're participants in it too. And even if you're not engaging us to help you with your tabletop exercise, we still want you to have them and to have them be high quality and useful. 'cause that's a net improvement for everybody in the ecosystem.
I got lawyers to be altruistic,
Right?
It's my one dig in lawyers, my one
Joke.
So you've, you've talked about check boxes just a minute ago and it makes me thinking like, yeah, for many organizations compliance is still that kind of process, ticking check boxes. But a lot more often, and at this conference especially, we hear that this old school approach is no longer valid, like compliance reg regulatory frameworks. I mean, they become more complicated. They require much more sophisticated approach to solve them. So, but can you talk a little bit more from, from the legal perspective?
Yeah. So tabletop exercise aren't just a good idea. They're a really useful tool for managing your legal risk and really kind of all things considered it's an exercise that you get a lot of bang for your buck out of that, that what they are very useful for is they are evidence that you are kind of walking the walk on a security program, right? It's not just that you have policies and procedures, those things are all very important and, and really strong on their own. But you know, if you have an incident or if you, you know, have a, a review or for whatever reason you have a law enforcement, regulators, litigants who you need to be able to demonstrate that you're actually doing these things. A, a tabletop exercise, even if you've conducted under privilege, which is kind of a very big deal, especially in the US and increasingly elsewhere, you could still say that you, that it occurred, right?
Without getting into all the details about, you know, who decided what and, and all of that. It, it kind of stands alone as, as evidence that you're doing the thing that, that you're, you're saying you were in addition to that, it, it really is helpful as you're establishing kind of a culture of security. It holds people accountable to be prepared for their role. It forces, it's kind of a forcing function to get your different stakeholders into a room to work through these things. And as you mentioned, right in the past, this might've been a check the box activity where it was very linear and everybody kind of says the expected thing, the questions were very formulaic and you've just said, said that you've done it instead, what we want to encourage is to use these as a real learning opportunity and to create an environment where people are not, you know, afraid for their jobs or, or anything like that to, to really establish trust and to really work through what are increasingly difficult issues. You know, for example, all the things that Emily and the, the panel before us just mentioned, these are, you know, new use cases and you know, you wanna be prepared for those,
Right? Right. Absolutely. I mean ai, it's like, it's not just a buzzword as some French people probably say. It's really a, a huge challenge and we just learned that it also already has some really practical implications, not just in compliance but across the border, across like every aspect of getting prepared for insulin response. So Naro, can you probably elaborate on that aspect?
Yeah. So when it comes to how we adapt our instant response strategies or how we think about instant response in the wake of ai, I think there are two things to keep in mind. One, for a number of areas, not much actually changes, right? AI is being used as a force multiplier. It is speeding up our ability to launch certain types of social engineering tax. I can better monitor the CEO's feed to know when they're traveling. I can use the context that I'm picking up from their Facebook posts to better launch a message internally. I can use AI to write better phishing emails. I can also use AI to better evaluate what I've already stolen from you so I can then see where I might gain greater leverage in my ransomware negotiations with you. All of those are scenarios that we are likely or at least should be already preparing for in our tabletop exercises.
Why? Because, well you should already know that they were gonna look for the crown jewels. You should already know that they were gonna try to send in some sort of phishing email. You should already know that they were going to try to impersonate an executive and do some sort of BEC type of compromise and then try to get you to wire the money or something else. These are already scenarios we were preparing for and as Matt always loves to say, you know, new facts, old patterns, right? That's really what that comes down to. But then there's an aspect that actually does have to change with respect to incident response. And this actually goes back to some of the stuff that Emily was talking about in her presentation. When you have the ability to in near real time mimic an executive and potentially their participation in incident response, how do you tell the real McCoy apart from the other real McCoy, right?
'cause they both look like the real McCoy. Now there isn't an obvious fake to be had. We actually just tried this exercise not too long ago at a briefing in the US with a cybersecurity agency and people actually could not tell the two apart the real from the fake. Some of 'em are getting that sophisticated. And so when you're gonna start to see that occur in real time, we're gonna have to start to think about new procedures for how do we authenticate or validate who this person is? How do we validate that this, this is the person for whom I'm, I should be taking orders versus this might be potentially su a suspect of, you know, impersonation of some sort. So there are things that are gonna stay absolutely the same and there are things that we actually have to start to think about that are gonna completely upend our existing procedures and policies during incident response.
And, and for those who think this is all kind of farfetched and futuristic, I can tell you we've recently in various tabletop exercises simulated almost everything that Emily mentioned. So, I mean hopefully you take notes during ours as well. But definitely having take hope, you took notes during, during her, her talk,
Right? Right. So I imagine as you mentioned, you have hundreds of customers or from, from the technology, probably even more legal use cases. They're all from different industries, they're all from different countries. They face different challenges. So I wonder, can you maybe talk a little bit about how can this entire guide this in a way it just like, it, it's also one document. How can it be modularized or adapted rearranged to address all those broad multitude of use cases?
Yeah, so I hopefully the way that you, you, you take this guide and, and incorporate it or use it to inspire your own tabletop exercises, it's really getting organizations to have the opportunity to work through these challenges together. I, I'd say kind of if I'm looking at themes across the exercises in, in, in my role is, is legal and often kind of planning and facilitating these, I I think the, the one aha moment is almost always around connecting the dots, right? That is you have these, these different roles and not just, you know, the, the, the tech folks but communications, hr, your leadership, people from your business and they're working through it that they start seeing how dots get connected because you know, there are very often things that when in isolation look very small, right? We've had four user accounts compromised, probably happens all the time if you're a large organization.
But then kind of simulating out the different things that may have occurred using those four accounts can turn into a big kind of snowball effect, right? If one of 'em is being used to impersonate ACEO and another is being used to farm information for, you know, fake announcements, all the different things that you can do with these new tools. That aha moment is seen how something that very small in isolation played into something much larger as it played out. And having that visibility across your different functions and all of the experiences that they bring to the table and their insights. Because your technical folks shouldn't be expected to have deep communications experience. That's their role. Similarly, your HR folks are not technical experts and wouldn't be expected to be. So by having that environment where you, you have that opportunity to, to work through things in kind of a non punishing environment and without the stress of a real incident really gives an opportunity for a, a lot of, you know, thought leadership within your company. A lot of chances to discover gaps and really all that comes together often because they're at some point in the exercise it'll have been something that seemed very small that turned out to be something very big once all those pieces came together.
Right. So now I guess just like Matt, you probably had a lot of learning kind of moments during those exercises, but can you maybe share something like you were not expecting to learn at all? Something surprising.
Yeah. One of the interesting things when we first set out to help write this guide was that we were encountering a lot of, particularly counsel actually that was coming back and saying we received some unexpected responses that to only by chance during our last tabletop exercises or simulations around how it is we would communicate during an incident, right? They were receiving, you know this almost like there's this general assumption and it's not hard to imagine why. There's a general assumption that redundancy in our communications capabilities, the fact that we have email teams, slack, zoom and 14 other applications, meant that we wouldn't have to worry about how we would communicate when an actual incident occurred. Well, back in 2017 you were up against two types of adversaries. One that was just kind of passively listening in and they weren't making their presence known and the other that was principally looking to bring your communications down, right?
NotPetya was an example of the latter. They brought it all down. Mondelez suddenly had to turn to WhatsApp and phone trees to reengage the business and start getting operations moving again. But today's adversaries are actively mining your collaboration applications for credentials. They are actively observing your playbook in former, you know, previous responses and they're actively listening into your incident response communications, right? Whether it's on chat or they're joining your calls and now taunting your executives or your incident responders. And in so doing, they're inserting creating more chaos And what you have now is a bad assumption around your ability to communicate on these kind of capabilities because you won't be able to actually use them for incident response under those such scenarios. Right? And so that false assumption was one of the things that worried council because then they asked, well what would you turn to instead? And the answer they got back from the IT folks was, oh well we would go to WhatsApp, signal, telegram, iMessage, some litany of consumer oriented privacy.
Well we actually had a real life example or of a ransomware attack discussed earlier in this room. And they ended up with nothing because everything was either corrupted or unavailable or simply never planned for. And if I remember correctly, they used some test instance for Microsoft teams because they accidentally had it rolled out previously for some developers and then they spend days in rolling it out for the entirety of the workforce. Probably not the great example to learn from, but at least a real life scenario that yes, this absolutely happens not just your tabletop exercises,
Right? You need something like that in place. And the challenge is if you do happen to turn to those consumer applications, and this is where council was suddenly saying, wait a minute, we now have a problem. There's no centralized user management, there's no centralized policy enforcement, there's no centralized governance and audit trails. You can't go later back and prove who said one to whom when it was said or how it was consumed. And that becomes quite problematic under those scenarios, right? And so that was one of those interesting lessons learned is, you know, what are you gonna do in those moments? How do you put your incident response plans into motion and continue to operate under those conditions when you can't use the in-band technologies that you thought would be there for you because they've been compromised And when your consumer applications really aren't technically up to snuff, what do you go do?
Right? And that's where vendors like us come in. 'cause we actually do produce a technology that is designed around secure communications and collaborations under duress, right? For incident response for your security operations, for your threat intelligence sharing. And one of the last things I'll end on here is that, is that when you look at the regulatory drivers then, you know, whereas when we started writing this guide, not all of these are quite there and now they definitely are. NIST two, article 21, paragraph two J literally starts to define what an out-of-band collaboration capability has to be for the entities that are covered under NS two. Then in a separate area of NS two, the certs are also being told they have to be prepared with a federated secure information sharing capability effectively that they can operate internally within their member state for their companies, but also operate amongst each other to federate with the other member states in the eu. And so there's a lot more attention on this today than there say was even a year ago.
Okay, great. So do we have any questions from the live audience in the moment? We do.
So a lot of problems with game-based scenario training like this is that you're preparing for yesterday's attack because this is the input that goes into the scenarios. What are you seeing and what are you guys doing, especially in light of the, you know, the generative scripting and stuff that we just heard about in the last talk. How can we start to prepare for tomorrow's attack faster than our adversaries or writing tomorrow's attack?
So I'll, I'll, I'll take the first crack about what? Yeah, so I, I can speak from our experience. So with Moore, we're often working with kind of technical vendors. Armor text is, is one of 'em and other experts in the field to try to understand sort of what's coming. And also because, you know, I, my day job is, I handle incidents, it's, nru was gonna joke, I've been doing a ransomware negotiation all day, like this is my day job. So we're taking those lessons and seeing that that iterative nature of these attacks, the new twists you probably saw if maybe that, you know, black Cat, one of the ransomware operators filed their own complaint with the US Securities and Exchange Commission today about one of their victims. So that's, that's a new, that's a new wrinkle. If anybody had that on their bingo card for the day, the, the seeing these new twists and turns, but incorporating these new facts into the old patterns because a lot, if we're looking big picture at the attack, a lot of it doesn't change all that much.
It's the twists, the turns, the tools and you know the targets but you know, the core, they're, they're after something valuable, right? Either access somewhere else or something that they can monetize that you have. And it's just understanding how to put these things together and how to push and pull with an organization. 'cause I, I'm not a a, a technologist by, by training originally, but nobody wants my hands on a keyboard anymore. You know, setting up their, their shop. So what we're doing is focusing on the organizational preparedness, right? If you learn to code once upon a time, you learn the theory of coding, but you probably didn't focus all that much on the syntax. It's kind of the same idea here. You're learning how to respond, how to work through these issues and, and building that capability in addition to all your technical response pieces.
So I'll take the follow up to that though, which is to your point, the modules themselves are gonna go stale if they're out for there for too long. And so from our perspective, this is something that we want to frankly be publishing a lot more often. This is not a one and done, we actually plan to stay ahead of the card on this by thinking like the attackers and dreaming up what we would do if we were the bad guys. Right? So I have a list of predictions on where some of these will go and unfortunately two of 'em came true this morning, so I can't reuse them, right, to your point. Yeah. But a whole bunch of the others have not yet happened. But they do set up novel scenarios that you're going to have to potentially adapt to, right? To the, you know, this this new facts, old patterns still adapt to, but they do force you to think about the problem in new ways.
And so we plan to actually make this an iterative thing. The goal is to actually do it not just iteratively and you know, release more regularly but also make adaptations of this kind of work force specific nuanced use cases, right? Like the processes that an MSSP is gonna have to go to or think through when they have to do joint exercises with their customers or joint incident response are very different than your one company alone, right? Thinking about the impacts on supply chain and secure information sharing or threat intel groups also very different. Their adjudication problems that come up from a legal perspective that none of them had thought through yet. And so there's a lot more work to be done and we plan to continue to give back.
You have time for another. So I want to ask a question involved in the random acts of budgeting category. So, and this goes to the question of encouraging companies to do this because the budget, it's always gonna be a push, right? Especially in the US So you know, Dodd-Frank financial reform legislation put the CEO being liable and it didn't make the CEO E smarter just made the CEO yell louder at the financial people so that they make sure things happen. And cybersecurity insurance is not so developed now and having trouble getting that. And what does it cover? Has anybody talked about d and o directors and officers insurance as a vector to try to like do what Dodd-Frank did but not do it statutorily do it through the d and o category? So you're basically saying, look, if you want insurance on this, we give you cheaper rates if you go through this so that you encourage the c-suite to push this or do it through banking. Banking. If I wanna lend to you, if you're doing this, I'll give you a better rate 'cause I know my security is better.
Just speaking broadly, we're, we're already seeing that trend among counterparties banking. We see it in kinda m and a context. So buyers are definitely looking to see if you've done this within insurance, you know, better, better premiums, better coverage, better whatever, in order to access that. You know, there, there is some for a demonstration that you're prepared. And again, a tabletop exercise, why we've been so focused on it, why I'm very focused on it in my own practice is for a relative small amount of money. And some of these are, you know, different levels of complexity and you know, tailoring and all that. But relative to other spend, it's a relatively limited spend with a lot of value and that also in many cases helps focus the rest of your spend to the things that are helpful or things that were a gap or to reinforce things that were working or to wind down things that weren't it. It's really kind of a, an exercise that can be very much the glue of an organization's culture of cybersecurity and we're seeing that rewarded from all of these other counterparties. Do I think it'll start being required? I don't know. Do I think it's a good idea? I mean we clearly do because I mean we're lawyers giving it away in, in some, it's, it's really a priority for us and we think it should be for, you know, organizations out there.
You know, with my, with my former turban on right from my consulting days in security advisory, we would keep trying to drum home this point that if you run these exercises correctly, you can actually leverage them to better prioritize your spend, right? No one's got infinite budget, but we can start to produce that matrix that helps us understand what solutions are actually going to help us across the bulk of these scenarios, right? Probability and impact as well. You start to put those things together, that prioritization is gold. But I also think there's something else happening right now. The personal liabilities that are coming down the pike for executives, right? The very real financial liabilities, the potentially being blocked from serving on another executive board here in Europe for some period of time post a breach is going to drive a lot of change and a lot more respect for that process. And then that's actually a part of why this guide itself is so heavily focused on the executives and not just the technologists. It's actually, if you look at the bulk of the question material in here, it's actually focused on the executive tiers and audiences and the non-security, non-IT functions of the business.
It's interesting because it starts to establish duties of care, right? Where you don't have it. The problem is with having, you can't have negligence without duties of care, right? So you're starting to define it really disambiguate what you need to do. It's really terrific.
Yeah, and, and, and one of the things with these exercises is it can help organizations get out of that mindset of, you know, either I have to CYA for myself 'cause this is my responsibility and instead change the focus. This is an organizational responsibility in an organizational role. Not just, not just your ciso, not just your IT manager, not just legal, whoever, that it's encouraging all these functions to work together, which again gets to the organizational response, not the responsive executive A, B or C
Is any, can I ask one more?
Okay. But the last one please.
Does anybody do it the supply chain? Like not just within an organization or people starting Yes. Big partners.
Yeah, that's, it's definitely emerging trend. The focus on supply chain risk is, I, I think isn't news to this room is, is huge and growing it, it's certainly a focus of a place that, that we're, you know, planning as we kind of iterate through this, you know, hopefully that this, this partnership will continue. But, but yeah, it's, it's definitely a focus. It's definitely growing and we're, we're seeing a lot more of those interactions between the supply chain, the the, the government contracting community in the US and kind of the flowing, a lot of that liability down the supply chain has, has driven a lot of that and we're seeing it picked up elsewhere as well.
Matt's laughing because I have a master matrix of all the different guides we want to right like this and different nuances and one of 'em is absolutely supply chain because it builds on something that we already do, right? We work quite heavily with threat intelligence sharing groups. A lot of them are interdependent parties typically within the same sector for collective defense. But the lessons learned there are directly applicable to your intelligence sharing that needs to occur within your own individual supply chain. And so taking those lessons learned and feeding them here and then raising some of those same questions around liabilities and adjudicating different types of requests that then come up can absolutely be reapplied. And so it's definitely an area we want to focus on.
Okay. Awesome. Well thank you very much Naru and Matt.
Thank you.
