Gemalto feels secure after attack - the rest of the world does not

In today’s press conference regarding the last week’s publications on a possible compromise of SIM cards from Gemalto by the theft of keys the company has confirmed security incidents during the time frame mentioned in the original report. It’s difficult to say, however, whether their other security products have been affected, since significant parts of the attack, especially in the really sensitive part of their network, did not leave any substantial traces. Gemalto therefore makes a conclusion that there were no such attacks.

According to the information published last week, back in 2010 a joint team of NSA and GCHQ agents has carried out a large-scale attack on Gemalto and its partners. During the attack, they have obtained secret keys that are integrated into SIM cards on the hardware level. Having the keys, it’s possible to decrypt mobile phone calls as well as create copies of these SIM cards and impersonate their users on the mobile provider networks. Since Gemalto, according to their own statements, produces 2 billion cards each year, and since many other companies have been affected as well, we are facing a possibility that intelligence agencies are now capable of global mobile communication surveillance using simple and nonintrusive methods.

It’s entirely possible that Gemalto is correct with their statement that there is no evidence for such a theft. Too much time has passed since the attack and a significant part of the logs from the affected network components and servers, which are needed for the analysis of such a complex attack, are probably already deleted. Still, this attack, just like the theft of so called “seeds” from RSA in 2011, makes it clear that manufacturers of security technologies have to monitor and upgrade their own security continuously in order to minimize the risks. Attack scenarios are becoming more sophisticated – and companies like Gemalto have to respond.

Gemalto itself recognizes that more has to be done for security and incident analysis: "Digital security is not static. Today's state of the art technologies lose their effectiveness over time as new research and increasing processing power make innovative attacks possible. All reputable security products must be re-designed and upgraded on a regular basis". In other words, one can expect that the attacks were at least partially successful - not necessarily against Gemalto itself, but against their customers and other SIM card manufacturers. There is no reason to believe that new technologies are secure. According to the spokesperson for the company, Gemalto is constantly facing attacks and outer layers of their protection have been repeatedly breached. Even if Gemalto does maintain a very high standard in security, the constant risks of new attack vectors and stronger attackers should not be underestimated.

Unfortunately, no concrete details were given during the press conference, what changes to their security practices are already in place and what are planned, other than a statement regarding continuous improvement of these practices. However, until the very concept of a “universal key”, in this case the encryption key on a SIM card, is fundamentally reconsidered, such keys will remain attractive targets both for state and state-sponsored attackers and for organized crime.

Gemalto considers the risk for the secure part of their infrastructure low. Sensitive information is apparently kept in isolated networks, and no traces of unauthorized access to these networks have been found. However, the fact that there were no traces of attacks does not mean that there were no attacks.

Gemalto has also repeatedly pointed out that the attack has only affected 2G network SIMs. There is, however, no reason to believe that 3G and 4G networks must be safer, especially not against massive attacks of intelligence agencies. Another alarming sign is that, according to Gemalto, certain mobile service providers are still using insecure transfer methods. Sure, they are talking about “rare exceptions”, but it nevertheless means that unsecured channels still exist.

The incident at Gemalto has once again demonstrated that the uncontrolled actions of intelligence agencies in the area of cyber security poses a threat not only to fundamental constitutional principles such as privacy of correspondence and telecommunications, but to the economy as well. The image of companies like Gemalto and thus their business success and enterprise value are at risk from such actions.

Even more problematic is that the knowledge of other attackers is growing with each published new attack vector. Stuxnet and Flame have long been well analyzed. It can be assumed that the intelligence agencies of North Korea, Iran and China, as well as criminal groups have studied them long ago. The act can be compared to leaking of atomic bomb designs, with a notable difference: you do not need plutonium, just a reasonably competent software developer to build your own bomb. Critical infrastructures are thus becoming more vulnerable.

In this context, one should also consider the idea of German state and intelligence agencies to procure zero-day exploits in order to carry out investigations of suspicious persons’ computers. Zero-day attacks are called that way because code to exploit a newly discovered vulnerability is available before the vendor even becomes aware of the problem, because they literally have zero days to fix it. In reality, this means that attackers are able to exploit a vulnerability long before anyone else discovers it. Now, if government agencies are keeping the knowledge about such vulnerabilities to create their own malware, they are putting the public and the businesses in a great danger, because one can safely assume that they won’t be the only ones having that knowledge. After all, why would sellers of such information make their sale only once?

With all due respect for the need for states and their intelligence agencies to respond to the threat of cyber-crime, it is necessary to consider two potential problems stemming from this approach. On one hand, it requires a defined state control over this monitoring, especially in light of the government’s new capability of nationwide mobile network monitoring in addition to already available Internet monitoring. On the other hand, government agencies finally need to understand the consequences of their actions: by compromising the security of IT systems or mobile communications, they are opening a Pandora's Box and causing damage of unprecedented scale.



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