Just as we have returned from our annual European Identity and Cloud Conference, where we’ve spent four days talking about cybersecurity, identity management and privacy protection with top experts from around the world, we faced the news from Great Britain, where the latest large-scale ransomware attack has nearly shut down IT systems in at least 16 hospitals. Medical workers have been completely locked out of their computers. Patient records, test results, blood banks were no longer available. Critical patients had been rushed to other hospitals for emergency surgeries, while doctors had to switch back to pen and paper to carry on their duties.
How could all this even happen? Sure, the media often present ransomware as some kind of a diabolically complex work of elite hacker groups, but in reality this is one of the least technologically advanced kinds of malware, barely more sophisticated that the proverbial Albanian virus. Typically, ransomware is spread via massive phishing campaigns, luring unsuspecting users to click an attachment and then let the malware exploit a known vulnerability to infect their computers. Finally, ransomware holds the victim’s computer hostage by encrypting their important files or locking access to the whole system, demanding a payment to restore it.
This kind of malware is nowhere new, with a first prototype developed over 20 years ago, but only recently, as the number of computers connected to the Internet has grown exponentially along with availability of online payment services, has it become a profitable business for cybercriminals. After all, there is no need to spend weeks planning a covert targeted attack or developing evasion technologies – one can easily utilize readily available spam networks and vulnerability exploits to start collecting bitcoins or even iTunes gift cards from poor home users mourning the loss of their vacation photos.
In the last couple of years, we’ve learned about several major ransomware types like CryptoLocker or CryptoWall, which have managed to collect millions of dollars in ransom before they were finally taken down by the authorities. Unfortunately, new strains constantly appear to evade antivirus detection and to target various groups of victims around the world. The WannaCry ransomware that affected the hospitals in Britain wasn’t in fact targeting the NHS specifically – within just a few hours after being initially identified, it has already spread around the world, affecting targets in nearly 100 countries including large telecommunications companies in Spain or government agencies in Russia.
Personally, I find it hard to believe that this was the original intention of the people behind this malware campaign. Rather, it looks like “a job done too well”, which led to the uncontrolled spread far beyond what was initially planned. A notable fact about this ransomware strain, however, is that it uses a particular vulnerability in Microsoft Windows that has been weaponized by the NSA and which became public in April after a leak by the Shadow Brokers group.
Although this exploit has been patched by Microsoft even before the leak, a huge number of computers around the world have not yet been updated. This, of course, includes the British hospitals, which still largely utilize extremely outdated computers running Windows XP. Without the budgets needed to upgrade and maintain their IT systems, without properly staffed IT departments and, last but not least, without properly educating the users, the whole IT infrastructure at the NHS was basically a huge ticking bomb, which finally went off today.
So, what can we do to avoid being hit by a ransomware like this? It is worth stressing again that resilience against ransomware attacks is a matter of the most basic “cybersecurity hygiene” practices. My colleague John Tolbert has outlined them in one of his blog posts a month ago. We are planning to publish additional reports on this topic in the near future, including a Leadership Compass on antimalware and endpoint security solutions, so watch this space for new announcements.
There is really nothing complicated about maintaining proper backups and not clicking on attachments in phishing mails, so if an organization was affected by ransomware, this is a strong indicator that its problems lie beyond the realm of technology. For several years, we’ve been talking about the similar divide in the approaches towards cybersecurity between IT and OT. However, where OT experts at least have their reasons for neglecting IT security in favor of safety and process continuity, the glaring disregard for the most basic security best practices in many public-sector institutions can only be attributed to insufficient funding and thus a massive lack of qualified personnel, which is needed not just to operate and secure IT infrastructures, but to continuously educate the users about the latest types of cyberthreats. Unfortunately, the recent cuts in NHS funding do not promise any positive changes for British hospitals.
There is the legal aspect of the problem as well. Whereas oil rigs, nuclear power plants or water supplies are rightfully classified as critical infrastructures, with special government programs created to protect them, hospitals are somehow not yet seen as critical, although many lives obviously depend on them. If an attack on a power plant can be rightfully considered an act of terrorism, why disrupting critical medical services still isn’t?
Quite frankly, I very much hope that, regardless of what the motives of the people behind this ransomware were, cybersecurity experts and international law enforcement agencies team up to find them as quickly as possible and come down on them like a ton of bricks if just for the sake of sending a final warning to other cybercriminals. Because if they don’t, we can only brace ourselves for more catastrophes in the future.
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