Lifecycle, Privilege & Auditability

The procedures for limiting AI-agent delegation will be shipped by mid-2026. Microsoft Entra Agent ID is generally available as of April 2026, with Conditional Access policies for on-behalf-of and autonomous agents as of June 2026; OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange (RFC 8693), On-Behalf-Of flow, SPIFFE/SPIRE are all production-ready; NIST is launching an AI Agent Standards Initiative as of February 2026. Yet not one binding governance, risk, and compliance (GRC) frameworks   SOC 2, NIST CSF 2.0, ISO/IEC 27001:2022, NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5, or the legally binding Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA), requires bounded, time-limited, audited agent delegation. This paper makes that lag measurable: a stacked, control-by-control assessment of five frameworks across five NHI governance dimensions on a published Covered/Partial/Silent rubric, with every gap mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK technique it leaves exploitable. The analysis is anchored by two checkable findings. The NIST SP 800-53 IA-9 identity control was written for services, but it is assigned no baseline in SP 800-53B, so the right control is never required. The absence of agentic delegation in DORA rules out the claim that frameworks will simply mature into coverage. We characterize the transitive delegation gap for AI-agents as a primitive. We validate one RFC 8693 control that breaks a working kill-chain. We position the contribution against the mechanism and standards work that moved the field on in 2026. The gap is not what is possible; it is what is mandatory.

Least-privilege has been enterprise doctrine for machine identities for years, yet standing, static privilege remains the default almost everywhere it's checked. This panel pushes past the usual "just fix it" advice to ask what would actually force the change - and why technical feasibility alone hasn't been enough.