Blog posts by Matthias Reinwarth
The Digital Transformation is a game changer for many traditional organisations and a business enabler for many new trading companies and service providers in the digital world. When dealing with consumers and customers directly the most important asset for any forward-thinking organisation is the data provided and collected for these new type of identities. The appropriate management of consumer identities is of utmost importance.
Handing over personal data to a commercial organisation the consumer typically does this with two contrasting expectations. On the one hand the consumer wants to benefit from the organisation as a contract partner for goods or services. This should be as efficient as possible at a sophisticating level of user experience. Customer-facing organizations get into direct contact with their customers today as they are accessing their products and services through various channels and deploying various types of devices. It is essential to know the relevant attributes of that customer at the right time. The reasons for this are obvious: An improved user experience leads to customer satisfaction and thus to returning customers. User self-service leads to high effectiveness and cost-efficiency while speeding up processes.
Selecting the right items of information and a proper understanding of the quality and reliability of that data are essential management tasks. Customer identities are the result of the ongoing consolidation of data from various sources, including initial registration information, payment data, search requests, purchase history or helpdesk interaction. Consumers use various devices to access required services and they use different accounts in different contexts. Data gathered from external sources can be outdated, partially inaccurate or even deliberately wrong or misleading, especially when collected from social media. Business-relevant information is a superset of several types of information, including business-internal information, which has to be consolidated and assessed well.
On the other hand, the act of providing personal information to a commercial organisation will only be possible when the consumer can expect the required level of trustworthiness and security being applied to personal data. Trust is essential and losing this trust will inevitably endanger the business model and thus threaten the existence of an enterprise. This has been made evident by the high number of recent, massive data breaches. And losing trust into e.g. an online picture printing service or the payment card service provider potentially corrupts trust into many types of online services.
The key challenge is finding the right balance between collecting and consolidating all business-relevant data for the benefit of the consumer and the organization itself, while acting as a trusted custodian of data the consumer has entrusted the organization with. When aiming at long-term sustainable customer relationships it is mandatory to integrate the proper handling of collected, personal data into all business processes, while being compliant to regulatory requirements and data protection laws. This has to be accompanied by a continuous review and improvement process as security and compliance are evolving processes themselves.
This article has originally appeared in KuppingerCole Analysts' View newsletter.
Yes, you might have heard it in many places: "Cloud is the new normal". And this is surely true for many modern organisations, especially start-ups or companies doing all or parts of their native business within the cloud. But for many other organisations this new normal is only one half of normal.
A lot of enterprises currently going through the process of digital transformation are maintaining their own infrastructure on premises and are looking into extending their business into the cloud. This might be done for various reasons, for example for the easier creation of infrastructure allowing rapid scalability and the ability to replace costly infrastructure which is not mission-critical to be implemented within the traditional organisational perimeter.
For many organisations it is simply not an option to move completely to the cloud for various good reasons including the protection of intellectual property within the traditional infrastructure or the necessity to maintain legacy infrastructure which in turn is business critical. For this type of enterprises, typically large and with a decent history regarding their IT, of which many are in highly regulated sectors, the future infrastructure paradigm has to be the hybrid cloud, at least for the near or medium-term future.
Cloud service providers are required to offer standardized technological approaches for this type of customers. A seamless, strategic approach to extending the existing on-premises infrastructure into the cloud is an important prerequisite for this type of customers. This is true for the actual network connectivity basis and it is especially true for the administration, the operation and the security aspects of modern IT infrastructures.
For every company that already has a well-defined IAM/IAG infrastructure and the relevant maintenance and governance processes in place it is essential that Identity Management for and within the cloud is well integrated into the existing processes. Many successful, corporate IAM systems build upon the fact, that enterprise–internal data silos have been broken up and have been integrated into an overall identity and Access Management system. For the maintenance of the newly designed cloud infrastructure it obviously does not make any sense to create a new silo of identity information for the cloud. Maintaining technical and business accounts for cloud usage is in the end a traditional identity management task. Designing the appropriate entitlement structure and assigning the appropriate access rights to the right people within the cloud while adhering to best practice like the least privilege principle is in the end a traditional Access Management task. Defining, implementing and enforcing appropriate processes to control and govern assigned access rights to identities across a hybrid infrastructure are in the end traditional access governance and access intelligence tasks.
Providers of traditional, on premises IAM infrastructures and cloud service providers alike have to support this class of customer organisations to fulfil their hybrid security and hence their IAM/IAG needs. CSPs like Amazon Web Services embrace this hybrid market by providing overall strategies for hybrid cloud infrastructures including a suitable identity, access and security approach. The implementation of a concept for an "integrated identity" across all platforms, be they cloud or on premises, is therefore a fundamental requirement. Leveraging mechanisms like inbound and outbound federation, the deployment of open standards like SAML 2.0, the availability of APIs for integrative access to the AWS IAM/IAG functionality and the integration of existing policies into the AWS IAM policies implemented as JSON files are important steps towards this "integrated identity". For the access intelligence and access governance side the AWS CloudTrail component can provide detailed logs down to an API-call-per-user-level for the existing cloud infrastructure. Such extensive logs can then be evaluated by means of an existing Access Intelligence, an existing Real-Time Security Intelligence (RTSI) solution or by deploying the AWS analytics mechanisms like Lambda.
It is obvious that these are "only" building blocks for solutions, not a fully designed solution architecture. But we're one step closer to the design and implementation for an appropriate solution for each individual enterprise. Covering all relevant aspects of security and IT GRC inside and outside the cloud will be one key challenge for the deployment of cloud infrastructures for this type of organisations.
Hybrid architectures might not be the final target architecture for some organisations, but for the next years they will form an important deployment scenario for many large organisations. Vendors and implementation partners alike have to make sure that easily deployable, standardised mechanisms are in place to extend an existing on-premises IAM seamlessly into the cloud, providing the required levels of security and governance. And since we are talking about standards and integration: This will have to work seamlessly for other, probably upcoming types of architectures as well, e.g. for those where the step towards cloud based IAM systems deploying Azure Active Directory has already been taken.
The more elderly amongst us might remember a family of portable, magnetic disk based storage media, with typical capacities ranging from 320 KB to 1.44 MB, called Floppy Disc. These were introduced in the early 1970s then faced their decline in the late 1990s, with today’s generation of Digital Natives most probably not having seen this type of media in the wild.
Have you ever thought it possible in 2015, that your virtual machines, your VM environment, your network and thus potentially your complete IT infrastructure might be threatened by a vulnerable floppy disk controller? Or even worse: by a virtualized floppy disk controller? No? Or that the VM you are running at your trusted provider of virtualization solutions might have been in danger of being attacked by an admin of a VM running on the same infrastructure for the last 11 years?
But this is exactly what has been uncovered this week with the publication of a vulnerability called Venom, CVE-2015-3456 (with Venom being actually an acronym for “Virtualized Environment Neglected Operations Manipulation”). The vulnerability has been identified, diligently documented, and explained by Jason Geffner of CrowdStrike.
Affected virtualization platforms include Xen, VirtualBox and QEMU, but it is the original open source QEMU virtual floppy disc controller code, that has been re-used in several virtualization environments, which has been identified as the alleged origin of the vulnerability.
As a floppy disk driver still is typically included in a VM configuration by default and the issue is within the hypervisor code, almost any installation of the identified platforms is expected to be affected, no matter which underlying hosting operating system has been chosen. Although no exploits have been yet documented prior to the publication, this should be expected to change soon.
The immediately required steps are obvious:
- If you are hosting a virtualization platform for yourselves or your organization, make sure that you’re running a version that is not affected or otherwise apply the most recent patches. A patch for your host OS and virtualizing platform should be already available. And do it now.
- In case you are running one or more virtual machines at providers using one of the affected platforms, make sure that appropriate measures have been taken for mitigating this vulnerability. And do it now!
More importantly this vulnerability again puts a spotlight on the reuse of open source software within other products, especially commercial products or those used widely in commercial environments. Very much like the heart bleed bug or shellshock this vulnerability once more proves that relying on the given quality of open source code cannot be considered appropriate. This vulnerability has been out in the wild for more than 11 years now.
Open source software comes with the great opportunity of allowing code inspection and verification. But just because code is open does not mean that code is secure unless somebody actually takes a look (or more).
Improving application and code security has to be on the agenda right now. This is true for both commercial and open source software. Appropriate code analysis tools and services for achieving this are available. Intelligent mechanisms for static and dynamic code vulnerability analyses have to be integrated effectively within any relevant software development cycles. This is not a trending topic, but it should be. The responsibility for achieving this is surely a commercial topic, but it is also a political topic and a topic that has to be discussed in the various OSS communities. Venom might not be as disruptive as heart bleed, but the next heart bleed is out there and we should try to get at least some of them fixed before they are exploited.
And while we’re at it, why not change the default for including floppy disks in new VMs from “yes” to “no”, just for a start…
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